[EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best

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[EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best

steve bosworth

Originally, Gervase Lam suggested that Approval style voting could be used in Brexit Vote in Parliament.  My response was to suggest instead that Majority Judgment (MJ) provides the most Comprehensive, Simple, and  Informative Indicative Voting Method. Please see below a more detailed explanation of how MJ works.

I'm surprised that no-one has addressed my exact suggestion that Majority Judgment (MJ) would seem to provide a superior method.

 

Instead, SCORE voting, using 0—100 was suggested by William.  This suggestion does not take into account that most people cannot distinguish between more than about 7 levels of desired human behavior. Balinski & Laraki discuss this (pp.171, 169, 283, 306, 310, & 389) with regard to G.A. Miller’s 1956 article: The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review 63: 89-97.  This is why MJ’s use of only 6 grades from Excellent to Reject are more meaningful and discerning.  Also, these grades are more meaningful than numbers 1—6.  At the same time, unlike MJ, APPROVAL and SCORE would not guarantee the discovery of a BREXIT option that is supported by an absolute majority of all the voters' highest grades.

Please give any of your criticisms of MJ in this regard.

From: steve bosworth <[hidden email]>
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2019 6:24 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Comprehensive, simplist, and most informative Indicative Voting

 

Yes, Approval would work, but unlike Majority Judgment (Balinski & Laraki, Majority Judgment (2010, MIT) Approval does not guarantee finding the option most supported by an absolute majority, nor would it inform us how highly all the MPs grade each of the options.

Majority Judgment would allow the Commons to decide on one of the many options by an absolute majority as a result of counting one ballot from each of the MPs.  Each MP is simply asked to “grade” as many of the options listed as either Excellent (ideal), Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or “Reject”.  Each option not explicitly graded is counted as “Reject” by that voter.  The same grade can be given to more than one choice.

As a result, all the options will have received the same number of grades, but a different set.  The winner is the choice that has received an absolute majority of grades that are equal to, or higher than, the highest median-grade given to any of the choices.

The median-grade of each option is found as follows:

§  Place all the grades, high to low, top to bottom, in side-by-side columns, the name of each option at the top of each of these columns.

§  The median-grade for each option is the grade located half way down each column (i.e. in the middle if there is an odd number of voters, the lower middle if the number is even).

If more than one option has the same highest median-grade, the MJ winner is discovered by removing (one-by-one) any grades equal in value to this grade from each tied option’s total until only one is currently found to retain the highest remaining median-grade.

Also in contrast to ranking the options, the above Majority Judgment method does not eliminate any option before the Absolute Majority winner is discovered.  Therefore, only Majority Judgment would guarantee that a majority winner would be found.

What do you think?

Steve


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Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best

Toby Pereira
I don't think it's a terrible idea. However, I'm not sure it's necessarily to move beyond the simplicity of approval voting in this particular situation. And that's partly because tonight (for the second time) none of the options received a majority of approvals. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47781009 And I don't think parliament would be happy using an option because it received the median rating slightly-less-awful rather than just plain-awful. If it was to be expected that several options would get over 50% approvals then MJ might be quite a useful tool to distinguish between them, but at the moment a bigger concern is to simply get one thing that the majority of parliament is behind.

Toby





From: steve bosworth <[hidden email]>
To: EM list <[hidden email]>
Sent: Monday, 1 April 2019, 21:08
Subject: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best

Originally, Gervase Lam suggested that Approval style voting could be used in Brexit Vote in Parliament.  My response was to suggest instead that Majority Judgment (MJ) provides the most Comprehensive, Simple, and  Informative Indicative Voting Method. Please see below a more detailed explanation of how MJ works.
I'm surprised that no-one has addressed my exact suggestion that Majority Judgment (MJ) would seem to provide a superior method.
 
Instead, SCORE voting, using 0—100 was suggested by William.  This suggestion does not take into account that most people cannot distinguish between more than about 7 levels of desired human behavior. Balinski & Laraki discuss this (pp.171, 169, 283, 306, 310, & 389) with regard to G.A. Miller’s 1956 article: The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review 63: 89-97.  This is why MJ’s use of only 6 grades from Excellent to Reject are more meaningful and discerning.  Also, these grades are more meaningful than numbers 1—6.  At the same time, unlike MJ, APPROVAL and SCORE would not guarantee the discovery of a BREXIT option that is supported by an absolute majority of all the voters' highest grades.
Please give any of your criticisms of MJ in this regard.
From: steve bosworth <[hidden email]>
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2019 6:24 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Comprehensive, simplist, and most informative Indicative Voting
 
Yes, Approval would work, but unlike Majority Judgment (Balinski & Laraki, Majority Judgment (2010, MIT) Approval does not guarantee finding the option most supported by an absolute majority, nor would it inform us how highly all the MPs grade each of the options.
Majority Judgment would allow the Commons to decide on one of the many options by an absolute majority as a result of counting one ballot from each of the MPs.  Each MP is simply asked to “grade” as many of the options listed as either Excellent (ideal), Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or “Reject”.  Each option not explicitly graded is counted as “Reject” by that voter.  The same grade can be given to more than one choice.
As a result, all the options will have received the same number of grades, but a different set.  The winner is the choice that has received an absolute majority of grades that are equal to, or higher than, the highest median-grade given to any of the choices.
The median-grade of each option is found as follows:
§  Place all the grades, high to low, top to bottom, in side-by-side columns, the name of each option at the top of each of these columns.
§  The median-grade for each option is the grade located half way down each column (i.e. in the middle if there is an odd number of voters, the lower middle if the number is even).
If more than one option has the same highest median-grade, the MJ winner is discovered by removing (one-by-one) any grades equal in value to this grade from each tied option’s total until only one is currently found to retain the highest remaining median-grade.
Also in contrast to ranking the options, the above Majority Judgment method does not eliminate any option before the Absolute Majority winner is discovered.  Therefore, only Majority Judgment would guarantee that a majority winner would be found.

What do you think?
Steve

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Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best

robert bristow-johnson

 

While it's interesting that Score Voting requires too much information and evaluation from voters (in my opinion, voters are not the same as Winter Olympic judges) and Approval Voting requires too little information from voters, *both* Score and Approval impose upon voters the same tactical burden of deciding what to do with their second-choice candidate.

Since voters don't want their contingency candidate to defeat their favorite candidate, how highly should voters score or even approve their second-choice?

Ranked-Choice ballots do not suffer this inherent tactical-voting problem.  Voters know what to do with their favorite candidate and they know what to do with their second favorite candidate and they know what to do with the candidate they dislike the most.

r b-j



---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best
From: "Toby Pereira" <[hidden email]>
Date: Mon, April 1, 2019 3:04 pm
To: "steve bosworth" <[hidden email]>
"EM list" <[hidden email]>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

> I don't think it's a terrible idea. However, I'm not sure it's necessarily to move beyond the simplicity of approval voting in this particular situation. And that's partly because tonight (for the second time) none of the options received a majority of approvals. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47781009 And I don't think parliament would be happy using an option because it received the median rating slightly-less-awful rather than just plain-awful. If it was to be expected that several options would get over 50% approvals then MJ might be quite a useful tool to distinguish between them, but at the moment a bigger concern is to simply get one thing that the majority of parliament is behind.
> Toby
>
>
>
>
From: steve bosworth <[hidden email]>
> To: EM list <[hidden email]>
> Sent: Monday, 1 April 2019, 21:08
> Subject: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best
>
> #yiv1934316841 P {margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0;}Originally, Gervase Lam suggested thatApproval style voting could be used in Brexit Vote in Parliament.  My response was to suggest instead thatMajority Judgment (MJ) provides the most Comprehensive, Simple, and  Informative Indicative Voting Method. Please see below a more detailed explanation of how MJ works.I'm surprised that no-one has addressed my exact suggestion that Majority Judgment (MJ) would seem to provide a superior method. Instead, SCORE voting, using 0—100 was suggested by William. This suggestion does not take into account that most people cannot distinguish between more than about 7 levels of desired human behavior. Balinski & Laraki discuss this (pp.171, 169, 283, 306, 310, & 389) with regard to G.A. Miller’s 1956 article: The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information.Psychological Review 63: 89-97.  This is why MJ’s use of only 6 grades from Excellent to Reject are more meaningful and discerning. Also, these grades are more meaningful than numbers 1—6. At the same time, unlike MJ, APPROVAL and SCORE would not guarantee the discovery of a BREXIT option that is supported by an absolute majority of all the voters' highest grades.Please give any of your criticisms of MJ in this regard.From: steve bosworth <[hidden email]>
> Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2019 6:24 AM
> To: [hidden email]
> Subject: Comprehensive, simplist, and most informative Indicative Voting Yes, Approval would work, but unlike Majority Judgment (Balinski & Laraki,Majority Judgment (2010, MIT) Approval does not guarantee finding the option most supported by an absolute majority, nor would it inform us how highly all the MPs grade each of the options.Majority Judgment would allow the Commons to decide on one of the many options by an absolute majority as a result of counting one ballot from each of the MPs.  Each MP is simply asked to “grade” as many of the options listed as either Excellent (ideal), Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or “Reject”.  Each option not explicitly graded is counted as “Reject” by that voter.  The same grade can be given to more than one choice.As a result, all the options will have received the same number of grades, but a different set.  The winner is the choice that has received an absolute majority of grades that are equal to, or higher than, the highestmedian-grade given to any of the choices.The median-grade of each option is found as follows:§ Place all the grades, high to low, top to bottom, in side-by-side columns, the name of each option at the top of each of these columns.§ The median-grade for each option is the grade located half way down each column (i.e. in the middle if there is an odd number of voters, the lower middle if the number is even).If more than one option has the same highest median-grade, the MJ winner is discovered by removing (one-by-one) any grades equal in value to this grade from each tied option’s total until only one is currently found to retain the highest remaining median-grade.Also in contrast to ranking the options, the above Majority Judgment method does not eliminate any option before the Absolute Majority winner is discovered.  Therefore, only Majority Judgment would guarantee that a majority winner would be found.
>
> What do you think?Steve
> ________________________________________
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Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative

Toby Pereira
In this case though, some sort of approval/rating is needed because parliament have the option of rejecting everything, or accepting more than one proposal, which can then be further debated. It would be no good to find the Condorcet winner and simply implement that without knowing what the MPs actually think of it.

These "indicative votes" are not the same as a single one-off election for a candidate to a post. They are non-binding votes to see if there is any way of the UK leaving the EU that a majority of parliament can get behind.

Toby

On Mon, 1 Apr 2019 at 23:13, robert bristow-johnson
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Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative

robert bristow-johnson

 

you're right Toby.  MP's can be expected to take on the burden that Olympic figure-skating judges do and consider deeply and convert their subjective impressions into numerical ratings.

But They're Partisans!!  They do not want their second-choice preference to defeat their first-choice preference.  That will also affect how they adjust their Scores for each option that is neither their favorite option nor their most-hated option.

so i do not extend sympathy to MP's for being "burdened" with a tactical decision in their vote (as i do to regular citizen voters), but the issue still remains.  what keeps MP's from voting strategically, rather than sincerely, and a perverse Score outcome results?

bestest,

r b-j

(And i just cannot resist saying that pro-Brexit Brits are almost as silly and harmful as Trumpers are in the U.S.   Whatta goddamn shame.)


---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative
From: "Toby Pereira" <[hidden email]>
Date: Mon, April 1, 2019 3:40 pm
To: "[hidden email]" <[hidden email]>
"EM list" <[hidden email]>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

> In this case though, some sort of approval/rating is needed because parliament have the option of rejecting everything, or accepting more than one proposal, which can then be further debated. It would be no good to find the Condorcet winner and simply implement that without knowing what the MPs actually think of it.
> These "indicative votes" are not the same as a single one-off election for a candidate to a post. They are non-binding votes to see if there is any way of the UK leaving the EU that a majority of parliament can get behind.
> Toby
>
> On Mon, 1 Apr 2019 at 23:13, robert bristow-johnson<[hidden email]> wrote: ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>

 

 

 


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"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
 

 

 

 


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Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative

Bob Richard-2

The most basic problem in this situation has nothing to do with choosing among approval voting, score voting, the alternative vote, the Condorcet criterion, or anything else. It's to determine what options should (and shouldn't) be on the ballot.

Parliament's most conspicuous failure in this regard (in which they are joined by the entire press corps, as far as I know) is to treat a second referendum as it if were an alternative on a list of alternatives. The question whether to put a decision of Parliament to a confirmatory vote of the people is entirely separate from what decision Parliament should make. The questions are politically interrelated, in the sense that MPs on the losing end of a debate in Parliament are far more likely to call for a referendum than MPs who won that debate. (In fact, that's kind of what referenda are, at least in the United States.) But this relationship is no reason to include a such a confirmatory vote as an option in the current "indicative" voting process.

But that's only the beginning. There's also the question of whether to include "unicorns" on the ballot. "Unicorn" is the term used by U.K. politicians and commentators to denigrate proposals that they claim cannot possibly be implemented, for example because the European Union would never go along with them. Just asking this question makes it clear that it's really a matter of deciding who gets to decide which proposals are "unicorns" and which ones aren't. Good luck finding any agreement on that.

And, finally, there's the problem of clones and near clones. How many combinations of customs union and/or single market and/or regulatory "alignment" and/or technological alternatives to border checkpoints are need to insure that the ideal (and purely hypothetical) ballot includes the option that "should" win -- whatever "should" means in the context of voting and elections.

When people are voting on candidates to fill an office, the problem of nominations is very different and much more manageable. A set of qualifications can be agreed on in advance of any nominations being made. Votes for candidates who are not actually running can be disregarded. And so on. But when you're trying to formalize a process for choosing among more than two policy options, what the options are is often a crucial part of what the debate is about.

As far as I know, social choice theory and the study of voting methods have very little to say about this problem, except in one setting. That's the more normal kind of parliamentary procedure where everything is laid out as motions, amendments, substitute motions and so on. The well-understood limitations of that process -- the importance of the order in which amendments are dealt with, the role of strategic voting, and so on -- are exactly why we'd like to be able to vote all at once on a list of options in the first place.

--Bob Richard

On 4/1/2019 3:57 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

 

you're right Toby.  MP's can be expected to take on the burden that Olympic figure-skating judges do and consider deeply and convert their subjective impressions into numerical ratings.

But They're Partisans!!  They do not want their second-choice preference to defeat their first-choice preference.  That will also affect how they adjust their Scores for each option that is neither their favorite option nor their most-hated option.

so i do not extend sympathy to MP's for being "burdened" with a tactical decision in their vote (as i do to regular citizen voters), but the issue still remains.  what keeps MP's from voting strategically, rather than sincerely, and a perverse Score outcome results?

bestest,

r b-j

(And i just cannot resist saying that pro-Brexit Brits are almost as silly and harmful as Trumpers are in the U.S.   Whatta goddamn shame.)


---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative
From: "Toby Pereira" [hidden email]
Date: Mon, April 1, 2019 3:40 pm
To: [hidden email] [hidden email]
"EM list" [hidden email]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

> In this case though, some sort of approval/rating is needed because parliament have the option of rejecting everything, or accepting more than one proposal, which can then be further debated. It would be no good to find the Condorcet winner and simply implement that without knowing what the MPs actually think of it.
> These "indicative votes" are not the same as a single one-off election for a candidate to a post. They are non-binding votes to see if there is any way of the UK leaving the EU that a majority of parliament can get behind.
> Toby
>
> On Mon, 1 Apr 2019 at 23:13, robert bristow-johnson[hidden email] wrote: ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>

 

 

 


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Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative

robert bristow-johnson



---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative
From: "Bob Richard" <[hidden email]>
Date: Mon, April 1, 2019 6:40 pm
To: [hidden email]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

> The most basic problem in this situation has nothing to do with choosing
> among approval voting, score voting, the alternative vote, the Condorcet
> criterion, or anything else. It's to determine what options should (and
> shouldn't) be on the ballot.
>
> Parliament's most conspicuous failure in this regard (in which they are
> joined by the entire press corps, as far as I know) is to treat a second
> referendum as it if were an alternative on a list of alternatives. The
> question whether to put a decision of Parliament to a confirmatory vote
> of the people is entirely separate from what decision Parliament should
> make. The questions are politically interrelated, in the sense that MPs
> on the losing end of a debate in Parliament are far more likely to call
> for a referendum than MPs who won that debate.

i dunno if i said this here, or if i said this at another forum.

The really stupid thing about the Brexit vote in 2016, was that it was flawed in structure in the first place.  Not every state in the U.S. has Initiative and Referendum (like Vermont does not), but those states that do, **even** if they get enough signatures on the petitions to put a question on the ballot, that question must withstand some judicial scrutiny.  If the language of the question is flawed in insufficiently legalistic, if the acceptance of the question violates the state constitution, a state court can strike it out or even modify the language a little bit before it goes on the ballot.

The 2016 Brexit question would not have cut it at all with U.S lawyers, because the terms of the exit were not well-defined.  It needed to be planned to be **two** questions from the very beginning.  The first question would be similar to the sweeping, but non-specific question that had been asked (except for one important word):  Does the U.K. **begin** the process of exiting the European Union or not?  A majority of "Remain" would put an end to the issue, but a majority of "Leave" would direct the government to begin the Article 50 crap and negotiate the terms.  Then, in 2 years, and with well-defined exit terms that can be put into legalistic language, **that** should be put on the second referendum to ask the British people if they still want to exit with the terms that the government had negotiated.  Only if both questions were answered with "Leave" would the Brexit be fulfilled.

That's my opinion.  Whether a super-majority be required or not is something I would let others slug out.

But there is no way that the "Exit" decision be irrevocably made without the electorate knowing what the terms and implications of the Exit are.

Otherwise, it's just fucking stupid.

(The opinion of a Yank.)  Now you Limey's get to tell us Yanks how fucked up we are.  Because both of our countries are just screwed.

We're all so bloody screwed.   Nothing left to do but drop your pants and bend over.

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Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
In reply to this post by Bob Richard-2
This is all insightful. In a parliamentary setting, with a majority
required for any conclusion, voting on single issues Yes/No, works very
well, and problems can be fixed. (under standard rules, any member who
voted for the majority may move reconsideration, and it takes a majority
to reconsider, so, in theory, a change that would enjoy a majority will
be reconsidered. There would then be, with the original motion back on
the floor, a motion to amend, and then the majority decides which of two
versions is to become the motion under consideration.

This all can become more efficient if polling is used, which is
apparently what the British parliament is using. A final decision will
be put to a yes/no vote, with the poll having informed the members of
the support enjoyed by the various options, but they will not be limited
to them. Parliaments do not use top-two runoff! Nor should they.

Referring complex decisions to the public is a Bad Idea, in general. It
*seems* democratic, but, in fact, it empowers media and those who can
buy media. Rather, if we care about genuine democracy, government by
maximized consent, we would focus on electing representatives who are
trusted, and Asset with open ballots essentially elects seats with
*unanimity.* That seat was unanimously the choice of a quota of voters,
or those whom they voted for). Don't trust someone to represent you in
the process, don't vote for them! Don't trust anyone? I'd suggest
therapy, one has a social disorder.

Most of the complexity of voting theory is unnecessary. As a polling
method, score is simple and easily understood and canvassed. There may
be other forms that can be used, but this is often misunderstood. If a
decision is made that was approved by less than a majority, basic
democratic process has been lost. There is no problem if the methods are
used as polls, as advisory. And I have seen a majority position, that
would have prevailed in an initial vote (by maybe two-thirds!) reversed
after a simple approval poll, when those people saw that all members
(minus only one) approved a different choice. And when the
implementation vote was made on a motion to change to the
almost-universal choice, it passed. With unanimity.

We have very bad habits in politics, in aiming for our "favorite" to
win, instead of seeking what will make society function most efficiently
and least oppressively.

I agree that it would be the responsibility of Parliament to thoroughly
deliberate the issue, not to punt to the public. However, once
Parliament has maximized its own consensus, which can include generating
minority reports, and because there was a previous referendum, respect
for the public suggests then submitting Parliament's decision to a
second referendum. The second referendum could possibly present more
than one alternative, but not too many, and every option presented
should have majority support in Parliament! (The public can then reject
them all by voting no on all of them.)

Standard democratic practice: the status quo remains until explicitly
rejected and replaced by a majority. Someone else pointed out how
defective the Brexit referendum was. I agree.

We have very primitive ideas of what democracy can and should be.

On 4/1/2019 9:40 PM, Bob Richard wrote:

>
> Parliament's most conspicuous failure in this regard (in which they
> are joined by the entire press corps, as far as I know) is to treat a
> second referendum as it if were an alternative on a list of
> alternatives. The question whether to put a decision of Parliament to
> a confirmatory vote of the people is entirely separate from what
> decision Parliament should make. The questions are politically
> interrelated, in the sense that MPs on the losing end of a debate in
> Parliament are far more likely to call for a referendum than MPs who
> won that debate. (In fact, that's kind of what referenda are, at least
> in the United States.) But this relationship is no reason to include a
> such a confirmatory vote as an option in the current "indicative"
> voting process.
>
[...]

>
> As far as I know, social choice theory and the study of voting methods
> have very little to say about this problem, except in one setting.
> That's the more normal kind of parliamentary procedure where
> everything is laid out as motions, amendments, substitute motions and
> so on. The well-understood limitations of that process -- the
> importance of the order in which amendments are dealt with, the role
> of strategic voting, and so on -- are exactly why we'd like to be able
> to vote all at once on a list of options in the first place.
>
> info
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Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best

steve bosworth
In reply to this post by Toby Pereira
Hi Toby,
Strictly speaking, it is only possible for the relevant median-grade to be Reject.  At the same time, Reject is less likely to be the initial median result with MJ as compared with Approval.  Firstly this is because MJ offers 4 levels of approval (Excellent, Very Good, Good, and Acceptable) while  Approval offers only one.  This allows MJ to provide more relevant information for the count and makes it slightly less likely that MPs will vote tactically.  Finally, this relevant additional information also has the advantage of allowing MJ to discover the one winner out any number of potential winners -- because initially they all have the same median-grade (e.g. Reject):  One by one, one grade equal in value to the currently shared median-grade is removed from the current total held by each tied option.  This continues until only one of the previously tied options has the highest median-grade.  This winner at least has a plurality of votes higher than or equal to the current highest median-grade.
What do you think?
Steve 


From: Toby Pereira <[hidden email]>
Sent: Tuesday, April 2, 2019 7:25 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best
 
All options were rejected by a majority of MPs so the median grade for all options is likely to be one of the reject grades. That's all really!

On Tue, 2 Apr 2019 at 3:25, steve bosworth

Hi Toby,
Why do you characterize as "slightly-less-awful" the only option that has received an absolute majority of the grades that are higher than, or equal to, the highest median-grade received by any of the options?  Perhaps you mean that any variety of BREXIT is awful.  We'd agree about that.
In any case, like MJ, would your preferred method also guarantee the finding of an option with such majority support?  Would your preferred method prompt voters to vote with as much meaning and discernment?  Does it offer less scope for tactical voting?  Given that each grade given by every MP in Parliament would help to determine the MJ winner, would not this discover the option most likely to receive the continued support of a majority in parliament?
I look forward to your clarifications.


From: Toby Pereira <[hidden email]>
Sent: Monday, April 1, 2019 10:04 PM
To: steve bosworth; EM list
Subject: Re: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best
 
I don't think it's a terrible idea. However, I'm not sure it's necessarily to move beyond the simplicity of approval voting in this particular situation. And that's partly because tonight (for the second time) none of the options received a majority of approvals. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-47781009 And I don't think parliament would be happy using an option because it received the median rating slightly-less-awful rather than just plain-awful. If it was to be expected that several options would get over 50% approvals then MJ might be quite a useful tool to distinguish between them, but at the moment a bigger concern is to simply get one thing that the majority of parliament is behind.

Toby





From: steve bosworth <[hidden email]>
To: EM list <[hidden email]>
Sent: Monday, 1 April 2019, 21:08
Subject: [EM] Comprehensive, Simple, and Informative Indicative Voting Method:: MJ is best

Originally, Gervase Lam suggested that Approval style voting could be used in Brexit Vote in Parliament.  My response was to suggest instead that Majority Judgment (MJ) provides the most Comprehensive, Simple, and  Informative Indicative Voting Method. Please see below a more detailed explanation of how MJ works.
I'm surprised that no-one has addressed my exact suggestion that Majority Judgment (MJ) would seem to provide a superior method.
 
Instead, SCORE voting, using 0—100 was suggested by William.  This suggestion does not take into account that most people cannot distinguish between more than about 7 levels of desired human behavior. Balinski & Laraki discuss this (pp.171, 169, 283, 306, 310, & 389) with regard to G.A. Miller’s 1956 article: The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review 63: 89-97.  This is why MJ’s use of only 6 grades from Excellent to Reject are more meaningful and discerning.  Also, these grades are more meaningful than numbers 1—6.  At the same time, unlike MJ, APPROVAL and SCORE would not guarantee the discovery of a BREXIT option that is supported by an absolute majority of all the voters' highest grades.
Please give any of your criticisms of MJ in this regard.
From: steve bosworth <[hidden email]>
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2019 6:24 AM
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Comprehensive, simplist, and most informative Indicative Voting
 
Yes, Approval would work, but unlike Majority Judgment (Balinski & Laraki, Majority Judgment (2010, MIT) Approval does not guarantee finding the option most supported by an absolute majority, nor would it inform us how highly all the MPs grade each of the options.
Majority Judgment would allow the Commons to decide on one of the many options by an absolute majority as a result of counting one ballot from each of the MPs.  Each MP is simply asked to “grade” as many of the options listed as either Excellent (ideal), Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or “Reject”.  Each option not explicitly graded is counted as “Reject” by that voter.  The same grade can be given to more than one choice.
As a result, all the options will have received the same number of grades, but a different set.  The winner is the choice that has received an absolute majority of grades that are equal to, or higher than, the highest median-grade given to any of the choices.
The median-grade of each option is found as follows:
§  Place all the grades, high to low, top to bottom, in side-by-side columns, the name of each option at the top of each of these columns.
§  The median-grade for each option is the grade located half way down each column (i.e. in the middle if there is an odd number of voters, the lower middle if the number is even).
If more than one option has the same highest median-grade, the MJ winner is discovered by removing (one-by-one) any grades equal in value to this grade from each tied option’s total until only one is currently found to retain the highest remaining median-grade.
Also in contrast to ranking the options, the above Majority Judgment method does not eliminate any option before the Absolute Majority winner is discovered.  Therefore, only Majority Judgment would guarantee that a majority winner would be found.

What do you think?
Steve

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