[EM] Consensus Incentive Lotteries

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[EM] Consensus Incentive Lotteries

Forest Simmons
Here is a one parameter family of lotteries that encourage consensus: the bigger the parameter N, the greater the encouragement, while in every case allowing single minded minorities to have proportional probability for representation:

1. The voters submit approval style ballots.

2. The approval totals are tallied.

3. After thorough mixing of ballots a set of N ballots are drawn at random.

4. If all N of the ballots approve one or more candidates in common, then from among those the one with the greatest approval tally (from step one) is elected.

5. Else the candidate approved on the first drawn ballot with the greatest approval tally is elected.

I need suggestions for a democratic way of deciding on an appropriate value of N.  In other words, how to discern the potential max consensus level.

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Re: [EM] Consensus Incentive Lotteries

Kristofer Munsterhjelm-3
On 17/02/2020 01.52, Forest Simmons wrote:

> Here is a one parameter family of lotteries that encourage consensus:
> the bigger the parameter N, the greater the encouragement, while in
> every case allowing single minded minorities to have proportional
> probability for representation:
>
> 1. The voters submit approval style ballots.
>
> 2. The approval totals are tallied.
>
> 3. After thorough mixing of ballots a set of N ballots are drawn at random.
>
> 4. If all N of the ballots approve one or more candidates in common,
> then from among those the one with the greatest approval tally (from
> step one) is elected.
>
> 5. Else the candidate approved on the first drawn ballot with the
> greatest approval tally is elected.
>
> I need suggestions for a democratic way of deciding on an appropriate
> value of N.  In other words, how to discern the potential max consensus
> level.

You could vary N to fit an approximate supermajority requirement.
However, I think it would be better and easier (having less of a sloping
cutoff) to just make that requirement explicit:

- The voters submit approval style ballots.
- The approval totals are tallied.
- If there exists at least one candidate for which there exists a group
of x% of the whole electorate approving this candidate, then elect the
candidate among these with the greatest approval tally.
- Otherwise, choose a random ballot and pick the approved candidate with
the greatest tally.

You could use IBIFA/Relevant Ratings-type logic to reduce the problems
with a hard threshold just like those methods do.

-km
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