On 17/02/2020 01.52, Forest Simmons wrote:

> Here is a one parameter family of lotteries that encourage consensus:

> the bigger the parameter N, the greater the encouragement, while in

> every case allowing single minded minorities to have proportional

> probability for representation:

>

> 1. The voters submit approval style ballots.

>

> 2. The approval totals are tallied.

>

> 3. After thorough mixing of ballots a set of N ballots are drawn at random.

>

> 4. If all N of the ballots approve one or more candidates in common,

> then from among those the one with the greatest approval tally (from

> step one) is elected.

>

> 5. Else the candidate approved on the first drawn ballot with the

> greatest approval tally is elected.

>

> I need suggestions for a democratic way of deciding on an appropriate

> value of N. In other words, how to discern the potential max consensus

> level.

You could vary N to fit an approximate supermajority requirement.

However, I think it would be better and easier (having less of a sloping

cutoff) to just make that requirement explicit:

- The voters submit approval style ballots.

- The approval totals are tallied.

- If there exists at least one candidate for which there exists a group

of x% of the whole electorate approving this candidate, then elect the

candidate among these with the greatest approval tally.

- Otherwise, choose a random ballot and pick the approved candidate with

the greatest tally.

You could use IBIFA/Relevant Ratings-type logic to reduce the problems

with a hard threshold just like those methods do.

-km

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