This is my favourite Condorcet method that uses high-intensity
Score ballots (say 0-100):

*Voters fill out high-intensity Score ballots (say 0-100) with
many more available distinct scores

(or rating slots) than there are candidates. Default score is
zero.

1. Inferring ranking from scores, if there is a pairwise beats-all
candidate that candidate wins.

2. Otherwise infer approval from score by interpreting each ballot
as showing approval for the

candidates it scores above the average (mean) of the scores it
gives.

Then use Approval Sorted Margins to order the candidates and
eliminate the lowest-ordered

candidate.

3. Among remaining candidates, ignoring eliminated candidates,
repeat steps 1 and 2 until

there is a winner.*

To save time we can start by eliminating all the non-members of
the Smith set and stop when

we have ordered the last 3 candidates and then elect the
highest-ordered one.

https://electowiki.org/wiki/Approval_Sorted_Margins

In simple 3-candidate case this is the same as Approval Sorted
Margins where the voters signal

their approval cut-offs just by having a large gap in the scores
they give.

That method fulfils Forest's recent 3-candidate, 3-groups of
voters scenarios requirements, resists Burial

relatively well and meets mono-raise. The motivation behind this
version is to minimise any disadvantage

held by naive (and/or uninformed) sincere voters.

Chris Benham

**Forest Simmons** [hidden email]

*Thu May 30 *

In the example profiles below 100 = P+Q+R,
and 50>P>Q>R>0.

I am interested in simple methods that always ...

(1) elect candidate A given the following profile:

P: A

Q: B>>C

R: C,

and

(2) elect candidate C given

P: A

Q: B>C>>

R: C,

and

(3) elect candidate B given

P: A

Q: B>>C (or B>C)

R: C>>B. (or C>B)

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