[EM] Yes/?/No

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[EM] Yes/?/No

Forest Simmons
Approval is one of the easiest election methods to explain and to understand; the ballots are identical to traditional FPP ballots except the instructions now say to mark the names of all of the candidates that you like instead of only one of them. As before the winner is the candidate with the greatest number of likes.

But what about the candidates that you just like a little bit? Do you include them or not? Where do you draw the line between like and not like?

Lots of perfectly adequate advice has been given on this topic, including "Approve everybody you definitely like better than the FrontRunner, including the FrontRunner herself if you definitely like her or if her strongest challenger is definitely worse than she is."

But trying to apply this excellent advice to a long list of candidates can be a very daunting task for the typical voter.

A much easier task would be the following: write "yes" next to the names of the candidates that you definitely like, write "no" next to the names of the candidates that you definitely dislike, and put a "?" next to the remaining names.

Now we are faced with the question, what do we do with these ballots? How do we count them?

 There are several possibilities some better than others. One obvious but not so good idea would be to elect the candidate with the greatest difference between the number of yes votes and the number of no votes, or equivalently, the candidate with the greatest number of yes votes plus half the number of question marks.

This method suffers from the Dark Horse defect; a candidate with neither any yes or no votes could win solely on the basis of being an unknown quantity if for example all the other differences turned out to be negative.

Another method is to have a runoff between the candidate with the greatest number of yes votes and the candidate with the fewest no votes.

The worst defect of this method is the inconvenience of the runoff.

One way to overcome this inconvenience is for each voter to designate a candidate as proxy in the runoff.

Which brings us to the method that I like best: the voters designate proxies to resolve the question marks on their ballots. Once the question marks are resolved the candidate with the most yes votes is the same has the candidate with the fewest no votes, so no runoff is necessary.

There are two possible ways to involve the proxies: (1) have them commit ahead of time how they will resolve any question marks, in other words have them publish prior to the election which of the candidates they approve and which ones they don't. (2) allow the proxies to use the delegated question marks as bargaining chips before deciding which candidates to approve or disapprove.

Intermediate between these two possibilities is (3) require the proxies to commit to preference orders before the election, but allow them to choose their respective approval cut-offs within these rankings after the haggling session.

I like the second option best but I think option three is a satisfactory compromise between the first two.

A summable data structure is easy to devise for realizing any version of this method.

Comments? Suggestions? Especially needed are suggestions for PR venues for selling the superiority of Approval voting for public elections over any other election method, in view of the extreme ease of optimal voting for any voter that this proposed implementation provides.

Thanks!


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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

robert bristow-johnson


> On 10/31/2020 9:03 PM Forest Simmons <[hidden email]> wrote:
>
>
> Approval is one of the easiest election methods to explain and to understand; the ballots are identical to traditional FPP ballots except the instructions now say to mark the names of all of the candidates that you like instead of only one of them. As before the winner is the candidate with the greatest number of likes.
>
> But what about the candidates that you just like a little bit? Do you include them or not? Where do you draw the line between like and not like?
>

i've been trying for a couple years to get the Election Science people to answer that simple question.  should a voter approve of their second choice or not?  there is no simple answer and the voter is burdened with the task of tactical voting.

> Lots of perfectly adequate advice has been given on this topic, including "Approve everybody you definitely like better than the FrontRunner, including the FrontRunner herself if you definitely like her or if her strongest challenger is definitely worse than she is."
>
> But trying to apply this excellent advice to a long list of candidates can be a very daunting task for the typical voter.
>

which is, in my opinion, the fatal flaw of Approval or any Cardinal system.  how much does one rate their second choice candidate?

> A much easier task would be the following: write "yes" next to the names of the candidates that you definitely like, write "no" next to the names of the candidates that you definitely dislike, and put a "?" next to the remaining names.
>

or, instead, we could just use a ranked ballot and rank the candidates in order of your preference.


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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

Richard Lung


Exactly, This is the reduction to the absurd (reductio ad absurdum) of
cumulative voting/approval voting  to preference voting/ranked choice
voting.

Thank you for saving me the bother.

Richard L.



On 01/11/2020 01:34, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

>
>> On 10/31/2020 9:03 PM Forest Simmons <[hidden email]> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Approval is one of the easiest election methods to explain and to understand; the ballots are identical to traditional FPP ballots except the instructions now say to mark the names of all of the candidates that you like instead of only one of them. As before the winner is the candidate with the greatest number of likes.
>>
>> But what about the candidates that you just like a little bit? Do you include them or not? Where do you draw the line between like and not like?
>>
> i've been trying for a couple years to get the Election Science people to answer that simple question.  should a voter approve of their second choice or not?  there is no simple answer and the voter is burdened with the task of tactical voting.
>
>> Lots of perfectly adequate advice has been given on this topic, including "Approve everybody you definitely like better than the FrontRunner, including the FrontRunner herself if you definitely like her or if her strongest challenger is definitely worse than she is."
>>
>> But trying to apply this excellent advice to a long list of candidates can be a very daunting task for the typical voter.
>>
> which is, in my opinion, the fatal flaw of Approval or any Cardinal system.  how much does one rate their second choice candidate?
>
>> A much easier task would be the following: write "yes" next to the names of the candidates that you definitely like, write "no" next to the names of the candidates that you definitely dislike, and put a "?" next to the remaining names.
>>
> or, instead, we could just use a ranked ballot and rank the candidates in order of your preference.
>
>
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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

Kristofer Munsterhjelm-3
In reply to this post by robert bristow-johnson
On 01/11/2020 02.34, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

>
>
>> On 10/31/2020 9:03 PM Forest Simmons <[hidden email]> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Approval is one of the easiest election methods to explain and to
>> understand; the ballots are identical to traditional FPP ballots except
>> the instructions now say to mark the names of all of the candidates that
>> you like instead of only one of them. As before the winner is the
>> candidate with the greatest number of likes.
>>
>> But what about the candidates that you just like a little bit? Do
>> you include them or not? Where do you draw the line between like and not like?
>>
>
> i've been trying for a couple years to get the Election Science
> people to answer that simple question.  should a voter approve of their second
> choice or not?  there is no simple answer and the voter is burdened with
> the task of tactical voting.

The simple answer is that any ranked method has to decide the answer to
some pretty tough elections. (Burlington being one of them.) Approval
abdicates the responsibility to get them right, and places it on the
voters instead. That's how it can, on paper, satisfy so many desirable
properties (like IIA); but in a sense, it's a trick.

Approval is very simple to understand (procedurally) and count, and it
probably *is* the best incremental change to FPTP if you're only allowed
to make a slight change. But if you can aim higher, there are plenty of
ranked methods better than it. IMHO.

-km
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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

Kristofer Munsterhjelm-3
In reply to this post by Forest Simmons
On 01/11/2020 02.03, Forest Simmons wrote:
> One way to overcome this inconvenience is for each voter to designate a
> candidate as proxy in the runoff.
>
> Which brings us to the method that I like best: the voters designate
> proxies to resolve the question marks on their ballots. Once the
> question marks are resolved the candidate with the most yes votes is the
> same has the candidate with the fewest no votes, so no runoff is necessary.

It might not work if the proxy is more adamant than the voters, though.
Suppose you have something like the 2000 US Presidential, but the Nader
analog is even more convinced than Nader was that neither candidate is
unfit for office.

Then this candidate (the "Nader-analog") might publicly resolve that
"since I view both of my competitors as unfit for office, I will not let
votes for me go to either of them", and thus turn a ? for the
Gore-analog on a Green-analog ballot into no approval. However, his
voters might prefer the lesser evil if the election comes out to Gore vs
Bush.

ON the other hand, perhaps this isn't a problem. When the third party
hard case candidate has only fringe support, the Lesser Evil>Fringe
voters can approve of both LE and F. And when the third party has
roughly even support with the others (e.g. Burlington), then it's
unlikely that the third party candidate would be such a hard case to
begin with.
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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

Juho Laatu-4
In reply to this post by Forest Simmons
One problem with options (2) and (3) is that they make buying and selling votes possible (by the proxies). How about using some IRV like heuristic approach in option (3)? The "?" ratings could be automatically raised to the "Yes" category or lowered to "No" depending on who the forerunner/forerunners are at each stage of the counting process. I don't have any detailed proposal on how that could best be done, but maybe some sensible methods could be constructed.

Maybe also a one shot approach, where all "?" ratings would be automatically changed to "Yes" or "No" at one go, depending on the voter given "Yes" and "No" ratings, would be possible. (i.e. not having multiple serial IRV style rounds)

I'm always a bit afraid of negative votes because of the Dark Horse and related problems. It is quite common that elections have two or three well known strong candidates, and as a result of that competitive setting, those candidates may also get lots of negative votes, although there may be also many other candidates that are clearly worse than they are. (maybe in up to 2/3 of the ballots when there are 3 strong candidates)

In elections where voters are expected not to rank or rate most of the candidates, because of the hight number of candidates, rating/ranking only some of the best candidates is a good practical approach. Ranking some of them might not be much more difficult than approving some of them (and maybe ranking some of them as "No" or "?"). One could also intentionally limit the number of candidates that one can rank, or the number of ranks that one can use. In the latter case the ballot could be quite similar to the Yes/?/No ballot. The ratings/ranks could be e.g. 1/2/3 and default last position if not marked. Multiple candidates could get the same rating/ranking. My point here is to compare the amount of information, difficulty of voting, impact of negative votes, and fairness of results in elections with long list of candidates and only few rated/ranked candidates.

BR, Juho

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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

robert bristow-johnson
In reply to this post by Kristofer Munsterhjelm-3


> On 11/02/2020 5:00 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[hidden email]> wrote:
>
>  
> On 01/11/2020 02.34, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> >
> >
> >> On 10/31/2020 9:03 PM Forest Simmons <[hidden email]> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> Approval is one of the easiest election methods to explain and to
> >> understand; the ballots are identical to traditional FPP ballots except
> >> the instructions now say to mark the names of all of the candidates that
> >> you like instead of only one of them. As before the winner is the
> >> candidate with the greatest number of likes.
> >>
> >> But what about the candidates that you just like a little bit? Do
> >> you include them or not? Where do you draw the line between like and not like?
> >>
> >
> > i've been trying for a couple years to get the Election Science
> > people to answer that simple question.  should a voter approve of their second
> > choice or not?  there is no simple answer and the voter is burdened with
> > the task of tactical voting.
>
> The simple answer is that any ranked method has to decide the answer to
> some pretty tough elections. (Burlington being one of them.) Approval
> abdicates the responsibility to get them right, and places it on the
> voters instead.

that's not an answer (simple or not) to my question.  the question is simply this: in Fargo North Dakota (which, BTW, is 30 km from where i grew up in the '50s, '60s, and '70s) where they have adopted Approval Voting (as best as i can tell, it's the only U.S. jurisdiction to do so), in an election with 3 or more candidates, should the voter Approve their second-preferred candidate?

that is a specific question.  and it has no non-tactical answer.

(but with the ranked ballot, there is a simple non-tactical answer to the question of what the voter should do with their second choice.  unfortunately, with Hare-STV that simple answer might hurt the voter's political interest.)

> That's how it can, on paper, satisfy so many desirable
> properties (like IIA); but in a sense, it's a trick.
>
> Approval is very simple to understand (procedurally) and count,

but it's not easy to vote.  it forces every voter to vote tactically.

> and it
> probably *is* the best incremental change to FPTP if you're only allowed
> to make a slight change. But if you can aim higher, there are plenty of
> ranked methods better than it. IMHO.
>

since we're already making the leap to RCV (and this year it looks like RCV is picking up steam), we should make a slight change to RCV to fix this obvious problem that was manifest in Burlington Vermont in 2009.  as best as i can tell, BTR-STV is the simplest, slightest change that does that.

BTW, in case anyone is interested, I wrote a "white paper" directed toward Burlingtonians (and other Vermonters) about this that has slightly more accurate numbers than either Warren Smith or Brian Olson's analysis.

https://www.dropbox.com/s/umfyn6roysithpg/The%20Impetus%2C%20Necessity%2C%20and%20Purpose%20of%20Ranked-Choice%20Voting.pdf?dl=0

and i have been able to find a nice and free copy of the Scientific American article from 2004, co-written by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin about RCV and Condorcet.  but i don't like his terminology in two cases.

https://www.dropbox.com/s/jl8cwhwhdsy10gh/The%20Fairest%20Vote%20of%20All.pdf?dl=0

also, I didn't report that, despite a mayoral veto, i was not successful in getting a Condorcet-compliant RCV on to the ballot for March Town Meeting.  but the Progs have fucked up their RCV ballot question so bad that i think it will fail in March.  i **did** persuade a couple of state legislators (one on the Gov. Ops. committee) as to what the problem is and what a solution could be (and i am plugging BTR-STV, simply because it is the simplest adjustment to the existing Hare STV to make it Condorcet compliant, sorry Markus).

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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

Kristofer Munsterhjelm-3
On 02/11/2020 16.32, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

>
>
>> On 11/02/2020 5:00 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[hidden email]> wrote:
>>
>>  
>> On 01/11/2020 02.34, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> On 10/31/2020 9:03 PM Forest Simmons <[hidden email]> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Approval is one of the easiest election methods to explain and to
>>>> understand; the ballots are identical to traditional FPP ballots except
>>>> the instructions now say to mark the names of all of the candidates that
>>>> you like instead of only one of them. As before the winner is the
>>>> candidate with the greatest number of likes.
>>>>
>>>> But what about the candidates that you just like a little bit? Do
>>>> you include them or not? Where do you draw the line between like and not like?
>>>>
>>>
>>> i've been trying for a couple years to get the Election Science
>>> people to answer that simple question.  should a voter approve of their second
>>> choice or not?  there is no simple answer and the voter is burdened with
>>> the task of tactical voting.
>>
>> The simple answer is that any ranked method has to decide the answer to
>> some pretty tough elections. (Burlington being one of them.) Approval
>> abdicates the responsibility to get them right, and places it on the
>> voters instead.
>
> that's not an answer (simple or not) to my question.  the question
> is simply this: in Fargo North Dakota (which, BTW, is 30 km from where i
> grew up in the '50s, '60s, and '70s) where they have adopted Approval
> Voting (as best as i can tell, it's the only U.S. jurisdiction to do
> so), in an election with 3 or more candidates, should the voter Approve
> their second-preferred candidate?

True. I should have been more clear: it is not an answer to your
question of when to approve, but it answers why it is the case that
"there is no simple answer and the voter is burdened with the task of
tactical voting".
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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

Andy Jennings
In reply to this post by robert bristow-johnson
On Sat, Oct 31, 2020 at 6:34 PM robert bristow-johnson <[hidden email]> wrote:

> On 10/31/2020 9:03 PM Forest Simmons <[hidden email]> wrote:
>
>
> Approval is one of the easiest election methods to explain and to understand; the ballots are identical to traditional FPP ballots except the instructions now say to mark the names of all of the candidates that you like instead of only one of them. As before the winner is the candidate with the greatest number of likes.
>
> But what about the candidates that you just like a little bit? Do you include them or not? Where do you draw the line between like and not like?
>

i've been trying for a couple years to get the Election Science people to answer that simple question.  should a voter approve of their second choice or not?  there is no simple answer and the voter is burdened with the task of tactical voting.


Approve your favorite. Disapprove your least-favorite.

Now imagine if the decision were between just those two, and it was being decided with a coin flip.

For each of the others, would you rather have them win or take the chance on the coin flip between your most-favored candidate and your least-favored candidate?

If you would prefer that candidate to the coin flip, then approve them. If you'd rather take your chances with the coin flip, then disapprove them.

~ Andy Jennings

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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

Toby Pereira
Approval voting can also just be seen as scores out of 1. So unless score voting is automatically tactical, then approval isn't either.

And for more than a handful of candidates, rating becomes easier than ranking, even if your method then converts the scores to ranks (as long as ties are permitted). It would be really awkward to be ranking a load of candidates only to find you'd missed one out of the order.

Toby

On Saturday, 7 November 2020, 06:35:24 GMT, Andy Jennings <[hidden email]> wrote:


On Sat, Oct 31, 2020 at 6:34 PM robert bristow-johnson <[hidden email]> wrote:

> On 10/31/2020 9:03 PM Forest Simmons <[hidden email]> wrote:
>
>
> Approval is one of the easiest election methods to explain and to understand; the ballots are identical to traditional FPP ballots except the instructions now say to mark the names of all of the candidates that you like instead of only one of them. As before the winner is the candidate with the greatest number of likes.
>
> But what about the candidates that you just like a little bit? Do you include them or not? Where do you draw the line between like and not like?
>

i've been trying for a couple years to get the Election Science people to answer that simple question.  should a voter approve of their second choice or not?  there is no simple answer and the voter is burdened with the task of tactical voting.



Approve your favorite. Disapprove your least-favorite.

Now imagine if the decision were between just those two, and it was being decided with a coin flip.

For each of the others, would you rather have them win or take the chance on the coin flip between your most-favored candidate and your least-favored candidate?

If you would prefer that candidate to the coin flip, then approve them. If you'd rather take your chances with the coin flip, then disapprove them.

~ Andy Jennings

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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

robert bristow-johnson

> On 11/07/2020 5:38 PM Toby Pereira <[hidden email]> wrote:
>
>
> Approval voting can also just be seen as scores out of 1.

yes.  Approval Voting and Score Voting are both cardinal instead of ordinal.

> So unless score voting is automatically tactical, then approval isn't either.
>

But Score Voting *is* automatically tactical if there are more than two candidates in the race.  Without tactical considerations, what score should a voter assign to their second preference candidate?

> And for more than a handful of candidates, rating becomes easier than ranking,

No, it's not.  That appears to be a claim offered with no evidence to support it.  It's like that perhaps it was just made up.

> even if your method then converts the scores to ranks (as long as ties are permitted). It would be really awkward to be ranking a load of candidates only to find you'd missed one out of the order.
>

And that's your reason why the ranked ballot is deprecated??!  That the voter will forget who their second choice is and will have marked someone else as their second choice and now has to squeeze their real second choice somewhere between first and second?  Or get a new ballot and fill it out again?

It's ridiculous.

>
> On Saturday, 7 November 2020, 06:35:24 GMT, Andy Jennings <[hidden email]> wrote:
>
>
> On Sat, Oct 31, 2020 at 6:34 PM robert bristow-johnson <[hidden email]> wrote:
> >
> >  > On 10/31/2020 9:03 PM Forest Simmons <[hidden email]> wrote:
> >  >
> >  >
> >  > Approval is one of the easiest election methods to explain and to understand; the ballots are identical to traditional FPP ballots except the instructions now say to mark the names of all of the candidates that you like instead of only one of them. As before the winner is the candidate with the greatest number of likes.
> >  >
> >  > But what about the candidates that you just like a little bit? Do you include them or not? Where do you draw the line between like and not like?
> >  >
> >  
> >  i've been trying for a couple years to get the Election Science people to answer that simple question. should a voter approve of their second choice or not? there is no simple answer and the voter is burdened with the task of tactical voting.
> >
> >  
>
> Approve your favorite. Disapprove your least-favorite.
>

Disapprove is no different than not approving.  Approve (mark) your favorite.  Leave your least favorite unmarked (which is as "disapproved" you can mark them).  What do you do with your second choice?  Or any other candidate that you hate less than your least-favorite?


> Now imagine if the decision were between just those two, and it was being decided with a coin flip.
>

Are you serious?  You are suggesting that a voter literally flip a coin on each candidate that is neither their favorite nor their hated?  That's not tactical voting?

> For each of the others, would you rather have them win or take the chance on the coin flip between your most-favored candidate and your least-favored candidate?
>
> If you would prefer that candidate to the coin flip, then approve them. If you'd rather take your chances with the coin flip, then disapprove them.
>

It's ridiculous to ask or to require voters to do that.  What a cognitive burden to place on voters to represent their interests faithfully.  If they cannot grok this tactical thinking, then they get to wonder (or fear) if they harmed their favorite or if they helped a candidate they dislike get elected.

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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

walabio
In reply to this post by Forest Simmons
        ¡You all make mountains out of MoleHills!


        0. Assign the best candidate, let us say Bye Jiden, a value of positive + 1.
        1. Assign the worst candidate, let us say Tonald Drump, a value of negative - 1.
        2. Approve all candidates with positive values.
        3. Disapprove all candidates with negative values.

        ¡It is that simple!  ¡That is how voters should approval vote!

       
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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

Toby Pereira
In reply to this post by robert bristow-johnson
As others have also discussed, you can give scores based on your intensity of preference. E.g. I like A a bit more than B but I like B a lot more than C. And Forest has discussed how you can use an imagined lottery to determine what honest score you should give to each candidate. Sure, that might sound a bit complicated, but I don't think that e.g. Amazon users generally have too much problem in giving a star rating to the products they buy, or that they would consider it to be automatically a tactical vote.

I don't think a voter will forget who their second favourite is, but I did say rated ballots become easier when there are more than a handful of candidates. Second place isn't normally too hard. I don't think an Amazon user would find it harder to decide to give two or three stars than to decide whether the product they've bought is the 8th or 9th best thing they've bought from the site.

See here https://www.rangevoting.org/RateScaleResearch.html for a discussion for rated v ranked. You can skip to the subheading "Rating is superior to Ranking".

Toby

On Sunday, 8 November 2020, 02:58:30 GMT, robert bristow-johnson <[hidden email]> wrote:



> On 11/07/2020 5:38 PM Toby Pereira <[hidden email]> wrote:
>
>
> Approval voting can also just be seen as scores out of 1.

yes.  Approval Voting and Score Voting are both cardinal instead of ordinal.

> So unless score voting is automatically tactical, then approval isn't either.
>

But Score Voting *is* automatically tactical if there are more than two candidates in the race.  Without tactical considerations, what score should a voter assign to their second preference candidate?

> And for more than a handful of candidates, rating becomes easier than ranking,

No, it's not.  That appears to be a claim offered with no evidence to support it.  It's like that perhaps it was just made up.

> even if your method then converts the scores to ranks (as long as ties are permitted). It would be really awkward to be ranking a load of candidates only to find you'd missed one out of the order.
>

And that's your reason why the ranked ballot is deprecated??!  That the voter will forget who their second choice is and will have marked someone else as their second choice and now has to squeeze their real second choice somewhere between first and second?  Or get a new ballot and fill it out again?

It's ridiculous.

>
> On Saturday, 7 November 2020, 06:35:24 GMT, Andy Jennings <[hidden email]> wrote:
>
>
> On Sat, Oct 31, 2020 at 6:34 PM robert bristow-johnson <[hidden email]> wrote:
> >
> >  > On 10/31/2020 9:03 PM Forest Simmons <[hidden email]> wrote:
> >  >
> >  >
> >  > Approval is one of the easiest election methods to explain and to understand; the ballots are identical to traditional FPP ballots except the instructions now say to mark the names of all of the candidates that you like instead of only one of them. As before the winner is the candidate with the greatest number of likes.
> >  >
> >  > But what about the candidates that you just like a little bit? Do you include them or not? Where do you draw the line between like and not like?
> >  >
> > 
> >  i've been trying for a couple years to get the Election Science people to answer that simple question. should a voter approve of their second choice or not? there is no simple answer and the voter is burdened with the task of tactical voting.
> >
> > 
>
> Approve your favorite. Disapprove your least-favorite.
>

Disapprove is no different than not approving.  Approve (mark) your favorite.  Leave your least favorite unmarked (which is as "disapproved" you can mark them).  What do you do with your second choice?  Or any other candidate that you hate less than your least-favorite?


> Now imagine if the decision were between just those two, and it was being decided with a coin flip.
>

Are you serious?  You are suggesting that a voter literally flip a coin on each candidate that is neither their favorite nor their hated?  That's not tactical voting?

> For each of the others, would you rather have them win or take the chance on the coin flip between your most-favored candidate and your least-favored candidate?
>
> If you would prefer that candidate to the coin flip, then approve them. If you'd rather take your chances with the coin flip, then disapprove them.
>

It's ridiculous to ask or to require voters to do that.  What a cognitive burden to place on voters to represent their interests faithfully.  If they cannot grok this tactical thinking, then they get to wonder (or fear) if they harmed their favorite or if they helped a candidate they dislike get elected.

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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

Kevin Venzke
In reply to this post by robert bristow-johnson
Hi Robert,

Does FPP satisfy your standard here? Under FPP you can just vote your first
preference, whether that is a good strategy or not.

If it does satisfy it, then I feel like your criticism of Approval is a bit
arbitrary, since we could simply add equal ranking to FPP and in so doing it would
be clear that the voter is asked to vote for their first preference(s). The answer
to your posed question would be no.

If FPP doesn't satisfy your standard either, that's reasonable, although I'm not
sure Approval strategy is much more burdensome than FPP strategy. (To my mind,
they are almost the same in practice: Identifying the best frontrunner is the main
task.)

Kevin



Le samedi 7 novembre 2020 à 20:58:30 UTC−6, robert bristow-johnson <[hidden email]> a écrit :


> >  i've been trying for a couple years to get the Election Science people to answer that simple question. should a voter approve of their second choice or not? there is no simple answer and the voter is burdened with the task of tactical voting.
> >
> > 
>
> Approve your favorite. Disapprove your least-favorite.
>

Disapprove is no different than not approving.  Approve (mark) your favorite.  Leave your least favorite unmarked (which is as "disapproved" you can mark them).  What do you do with your second choice?  Or any other candidate that you hate less than your least-favorite?


> Now imagine if the decision were between just those two, and it was being decided with a coin flip.
>

Are you serious?  You are suggesting that a voter literally flip a coin on each candidate that is neither their favorite nor their hated?  That's not tactical voting?

> For each of the others, would you rather have them win or take the chance on the coin flip between your most-favored candidate and your least-favored candidate?
>
> If you would prefer that candidate to the coin flip, then approve them. If you'd rather take your chances with the coin flip, then disapprove them.
>

It's ridiculous to ask or to require voters to do that.  What a cognitive burden to place on voters to represent their interests faithfully.  If they cannot grok this tactical thinking, then they get to wonder (or fear) if they harmed their favorite or if they helped a candidate they dislike get elected.

--

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"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

Forest Simmons
In reply to this post by Forest Simmons
I have been grading math papers for more than 40 years. When I first started I thought it would be more objective to rank solutions to a problem than to rate each solution separately. I used the Borda count on the rankings, etc. It's a good thing I didn't know about Kemeny!

With 30 different solutions to each problem on a 20 problem test, it soon became obvious that rating was much easier. If a problem has three main steps, and the student's solution does 2 of them correctly, then the partial credit is 2/3, etc. If the problem doesn't break down into distinct steps of roughly equal importance, you can ask yourself what is the probability that a similar approach would get the right answer to a similar problem? 

Similar approaches can be used for rating candidates...instead of listing steps to a problem list qualities a candidate should have ... instead of probability of correct solution to a similar problem, consider the probability that the candidate would correctly represent your position on a typical issue.

But it doesn't really matter which is harder; they are both too hard for the typical citizen.  That was Dodgson's insight 150 years ago... ranking was too hard for the the typical English voter...it would discourage voters, etc. Asset voting on the other hand is voter friendly!

Similarly, as has been pointed out many times there is a price to pay for all of the wonderful criterion compliances met by Approval. That price is externalized as a burden on the voter. The purpose of Voter Friendly Approval (Yes/?/No) is to shift the hardest part of that burden (the resolution of the question marks) onto voter designated proxies.

On Sunday, November 8, 2020, <[hidden email]> wrote:
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Today's Topics:

   1. Re: Yes/?/No (??alabio?)
   2. Re: Yes/?/No (Toby Pereira)


----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2020 06:15:35 +0000
From: ??alabio? <[hidden email]>
To: [hidden email]
Subject: Re: [EM] Yes/?/No
Message-ID: <439EB80C-149F-4F57-BEFD-[hidden email]>
Content-Type: text/plain;       charset=utf-8

        ?You all make mountains out of MoleHills!


        0.      Assign the best candidate, let us say Bye Jiden, a value of positive + 1.
        1.      Assign the worst candidate, let us say Tonald Drump, a value of negative - 1.
        2.      Approve all candidates with positive values.
        3.      Disapprove all candidates with negative values.

        ?It is that simple!  ?That is how voters should approval vote!



------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2020 16:26:38 +0000 (UTC)
From: Toby Pereira <[hidden email]>
To: EM <[hidden email]>,  robert
        bristow-johnson <[hidden email]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Yes/?/No
Message-ID: <[hidden email]>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

 As others have also discussed, you can give scores based on your intensity of preference. E.g. I like A a bit more than B but I like B a lot more than C. And Forest has discussed how you can use an imagined lottery to determine what honest score you should give to each candidate. Sure, that might sound a bit complicated, but I don't think that e.g. Amazon users generally have too much problem in giving a star rating to the products they buy, or that they would consider it to be automatically a tactical vote.
I don't think a voter will forget who their second favourite is, but I did say rated ballots become easier when there are more than a handful of candidates. Second place isn't normally too hard. I don't think an Amazon user would find it harder to decide to give two or three stars than to decide whether the product they've bought is the 8th or 9th best thing they've bought from the site.
See here?https://www.rangevoting.org/RateScaleResearch.html?for a discussion for rated v ranked. You can skip to the subheading "Rating is superior to Ranking".
Toby

    On Sunday, 8 November 2020, 02:58:30 GMT, robert bristow-johnson <[hidden email]> wrote: 


> On 11/07/2020 5:38 PM Toby Pereira <[hidden email]> wrote:
>
>
> Approval voting can also just be seen as scores out of 1.

yes.? Approval Voting and Score Voting are both cardinal instead of ordinal.

> So unless score voting is automatically tactical, then approval isn't either.
>

But Score Voting *is* automatically tactical if there are more than two candidates in the race.? Without tactical considerations, what score should a voter assign to their second preference candidate?

> And for more than a handful of candidates, rating becomes easier than ranking,

No, it's not.? That appears to be a claim offered with no evidence to support it.? It's like that perhaps it was just made up.

> even if your method then converts the scores to ranks (as long as ties are permitted). It would be really awkward to be ranking a load of candidates only to find you'd missed one out of the order.
>

And that's your reason why the ranked ballot is deprecated??!? That the voter will forget who their second choice is and will have marked someone else as their second choice and now has to squeeze their real second choice somewhere between first and second?? Or get a new ballot and fill it out again?

It's ridiculous.

>
> On Saturday, 7 November 2020, 06:35:24 GMT, Andy Jennings <[hidden email]> wrote:
>
>
> On Sat, Oct 31, 2020 at 6:34 PM robert bristow-johnson <[hidden email]> wrote:
> >
> >? > On 10/31/2020 9:03 PM Forest Simmons <[hidden email]> wrote:
> >? >
> >? >
> >? > Approval is one of the easiest election methods to explain and to understand; the ballots are identical to traditional FPP ballots except the instructions now say to mark the names of all of the candidates that you like instead of only one of them. As before the winner is the candidate with the greatest number of likes.
> >? >
> >? > But what about the candidates that you just like a little bit? Do you include them or not? Where do you draw the line between like and not like?
> >? >
> >?
> >? i've been trying for a couple years to get the Election Science people to answer that simple question. should a voter approve of their second choice or not? there is no simple answer and the voter is burdened with the task of tactical voting.
> >
> >?
>
> Approve your favorite. Disapprove your least-favorite.
>

Disapprove is no different than not approving.? Approve (mark) your favorite.? Leave your least favorite unmarked (which is as "disapproved" you can mark them).? What do you do with your second choice?? Or any other candidate that you hate less than your least-favorite?


> Now imagine if the decision were between just those two, and it was being decided with a coin flip.
>

Are you serious?? You are suggesting that a voter literally flip a coin on each candidate that is neither their favorite nor their hated?? That's not tactical voting?

> For each of the others, would you rather have them win or take the chance on the coin flip between your most-favored candidate and your least-favored candidate?
>
> If you would prefer that candidate to the coin flip, then approve them. If you'd rather take your chances with the coin flip, then disapprove them.
>

It's ridiculous to ask or to require voters to do that.? What a cognitive burden to place on voters to represent their interests faithfully.? If they cannot grok this tactical thinking, then they get to wonder (or fear) if they harmed their favorite or if they helped a candidate they dislike get elected.

--

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Re: [EM] Yes/?/No

Kristofer Munsterhjelm-3
In reply to this post by Andy Jennings
On 07/11/2020 07.34, Andy Jennings wrote:

> On Sat, Oct 31, 2020 at 6:34 PM robert bristow-johnson
> <[hidden email] <mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote:
>
>
>     > On 10/31/2020 9:03 PM Forest Simmons <[hidden email]
>     <mailto:[hidden email]>> wrote:
>     >
>     >
>     > Approval is one of the easiest election methods to explain and to
>     understand; the ballots are identical to traditional FPP ballots
>     except the instructions now say to mark the names of all of the
>     candidates that you like instead of only one of them. As before the
>     winner is the candidate with the greatest number of likes.
>     >
>     > But what about the candidates that you just like a little bit? Do
>     you include them or not? Where do you draw the line between like and
>     not like?
>     >
>
>     i've been trying for a couple years to get the Election Science
>     people to answer that simple question.  should a voter approve of
>     their second choice or not?  there is no simple answer and the voter
>     is burdened with the task of tactical voting.
>
>
> Approve your favorite. Disapprove your least-favorite.
>
> Now imagine if the decision were between just those two, and it was
> being decided with a coin flip.
>
> For each of the others, would you rather have them win or take the
> chance on the coin flip between your most-favored candidate and your
> least-favored candidate?
>
> If you would prefer that candidate to the coin flip, then approve them.
> If you'd rather take your chances with the coin flip, then disapprove them.

Doesn't that fail IIA in a very drastic manner? Suppose election A has a
left-wing candidate, a center candidate, and a right-wing candidate, all
of them respectable. Election B has these three plus someone who wants
to turn the country into a dictatorship.

It seems intuitively wrong that election A should pick (say) the center
candidate while election B should be a three-way tie just because all
the respectable candidates are preferable to a coin flip between the
favorite and the candidate with dictatorial ambitions.
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