Hitler-Stalin-Middle Example Again

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Hitler-Stalin-Middle Example Again

Craig Carey-2
Condorcet fans seem unable to comprehend that with 2 of 3 candidates being
"extremists" on a ballot that each "middle" voter will be in a tough
situation about what to do about their second choice vote (if any).

A middle voter may hate one extremist by "absolutely" minus 99.9 percent and
hate the other extremist by minus 100 percent- a "relative" differance of 0.1
percent.

If the middle voter votes for either extremist as a second choice, then such
extremist may get elected with a majority and claim he/she has a "mandate"
(to go politically crazy).

If the middle voter does not vote for either, then one of the extremists may
get elected with a plurality.

Since all middle voters will probably not be alike, then each of them may
strategically ask what are the other middle voters doing ?

Should I vote for an extremist or not ?

An example again (50 votes for majority)--

Hitler         Stalin            Middle
  42              41                  16    First Choice votes

Does any voter dare vote for a second choice ?

This is the real world. Russian voters in June will very likely nominate 2
extremists for Russia President putting Russian "middle" voters into the
above situation in the runoff election (with potential world problems in view
of the President-is-dictator language in the Russia Constitution).

The approval voting remedy remains to encourage the voters for the extremists
to vote also for a middle candidate who hopefully could get a majority.

Hitler         Stalin            Middle
  45              46                  51    Approval votes

It is directly due to the gerrymander indirect minority rule of legislative
bodies in the U.S. that there is a major degree of power madness surrounding
the various chief executive officer positions in the U.S. - U.S. President,
Governors, Mayors, etc.

If no reform comes to U.S. legislative bodies, then U.S. Civil War II is
highly likely (as in the last years of the Roman Republic with civil wars
between Sulla and Marius, Pompey and Julius Caesar and finally Antony and
Octavian (later Emperor Augustus Caesar)).

Witness the "personal" mudslinging among the Republican party candidates for
U.S. President- Can violence be coming between Republican candidates ?
Between Republican and Democrat presidential candidates ?

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Hitler-Stalin-Middle Example Again

Craig Carey-2
Demrep, I'm honestly beginning to wonder if you are trolling us here.  
You don't reply directly to arguments, and you don't seem to read any
rebuttal we throw your way.  Are you trying to waste our time, or are you
seriously trying to figure this out?  I'm more than happy to continue
explaining this to you if you are genuinely trying to understand our
support of Condorcet's method.  On the other hand, I'm going to refuse to
answer any more of your posts until you *specifically* address the points
I raise in this rebuttal.

On Fri, 1 Mar 1996 [hidden email] wrote:
> Condorcet fans seem unable to comprehend that with 2 of 3 candidates being
> "extremists" on a ballot that each "middle" voter will be in a tough
> situation about what to do about their second choice vote (if any).

You seem unable to comprehend that in a three-way race between 2
extremists on opposite ends of the spectrum and a small number in the
middle, *it doesn't really matter who the people in the middle vote
for*.  It is whether or not the supporters of the extremists will vote
for the middle candidate.  Under Condorcet's method, they are encouraged
to because it doesn't weaken their first preference.  Under Approval,
they are discouraged because there is no distinction made between first
choice and second choice.  If you want to talk about wacky hybrids, feel
free, but don't call them Approval or Condorcet's, because they are
neither.  Also understand that the MSC method you proposed is really
Condorcet's method, not Approval, if I understand it correctly.

> A middle voter may hate one extremist by "absolutely" minus 99.9 percent and
> hate the other extremist by minus 100 percent- a "relative" differance of 0.1
> percent.

So they can leave the two extremes unranked.  When the middle has such
weak support that extreme voters won't even rank them second, they won't
get elected under any method, so the only way their vote counts is in
picking which extreme gets elected.  At least under Condorcet's, they get
to pick their poison.

> If the middle voter votes for either extremist as a second choice, then such
> extremist may get elected with a majority and claim he/she has a "mandate"
> (to go politically crazy).

If an extremist gets elected, there is no telling what they will do.  
That is not a function of the electoral system.

> If the middle voter does not vote for either, then one of the extremists may
> get elected with a plurality.

Well, so?  Voters from one extreme can stop the other extreme by ranking
the middle candidate *without hurting their own odds of winning* under
Condorcet's.  If they don't do that, they aren't making even remotely
rational decisions.  No voting system is going to save people from
themselves.

> Since all middle voters will probably not be alike, then each of them may
> strategically ask what are the other middle voters doing ?

Why?  They only need to ask *themselves* which extreme they would prefer
if the Middle won't win.  

Besides, *The middle is not as important as the extremes*.  Repeat this
to yourself until you understand it.

> An example again (50 votes for majority)--
>
> Hitler         Stalin            Middle
>   42              41                  16    First Choice votes
>
> Does any voter dare vote for a second choice ?

Sure they do.  Out of fear that the other extreme will win.  All it would
take is 27 of the 41 Stalin voters to vote for Middle as their second
choice.  There is no strategic reason for them not to, unless they prefer
Hitler to Middle.  There is no strategic reason for the Hitler voters not
to rank Middle as their second choice, unless they prefer Stalin to Middle.
Hitler supporters' ranking of Middle only hurts Stalin.  It doesn't hurt
Hitler.

You assume that all voters will collude to produce a poor result.  There
is no system that can save you from that.

> The approval voting remedy remains to encourage the voters for the extremists
> to vote also for a middle candidate who hopefully could get a majority.
>
> Hitler         Stalin            Middle
>   45              46                  51    Approval votes

Approval voting does *the opposite*.  If these same voters are afraid of
ranking Middle second (as you said above that they are), then they will
*definitely* be afraid of approving Middle.  In Condorcet's method a
ballot of (Hitler, Middle) does not dilute the Hitler vote.  An approval
ballot of (Hitler, Middle) weakens the vote for Hitler.

Rob Lanphier
[hidden email]
http://www.eskimo.com/~robla



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Hitler-Stalin-Middle Example Again

Craig Carey-2
In reply to this post by Craig Carey-2
[hidden email] writes:

[Rob said most of what I was going to, so I'll just add a few things--Mike]

>
> Condorcet fans seem unable to comprehend that with 2 of 3 candidates being
> "extremists" on a ballot that each "middle" voter will be in a tough
> situation about what to do about their second choice vote (if any).

With Condorcet's method:

First of all, unless order-reversal cheating is attempted on a scale
sufficient to change the election result (improbable, due to its risk),
there's no penalty for Middle voters ranking a 2nd choice. Doing so can't
count against Middle or help anyone beat him.

But with Approval, Middle voters could be giving the election away
if they approve an extreme candidate.

Besides, with just 3 candidates, with Condorcet's method, Middle voters
don't really have a need to vote a 2nd choice anyway: If Middle isn't
Condorcet winner, then either Hitler or Stalin has an outright majority,
in which case it makes no difference if Middle voters vote a 2nd choice.
If, on the other hand, Middle is Condorcet winner, then it's the extremes
who should vote for Middle. Because Middle is the rightful winner, the
Condorcet winner with majorities over the others, and because a Hitler
victory won't bother Middle voters as much as Stalin voters, the Stalin
voters, if they believe that Hitler might have more 1st choice support
than Stalin, know that the Middle voters are in a better position to
defect than are the Stalin voters and that they will do so if they
have any reason to (the liklihood of large-scale order-reversal would
give Middle voters a reason not to vote a 2nd choice).

To summarize: 1) Unless order-reversal cheating is attempted on a
scale sufficient to change the election result, there's no penalty
for Middle voters voting a 2nd choice--it can't take away Middle's
victory. 2) If order-reversal is likely to be attempted on a large
scale, Middle voters' strategy is to not vote a 2nd choice. This makes
order-reversal backfire badly, every time. And the fact that Middle
voters can be expected to not vote a 2nd choice under those conditions
also means that the smaller extreme would be making a bad mistake to
not rank Middle in 2nd place.

I've mentioned strategy in the preveious paragraph, so I'll re-emphasize
that Condorcet's method is the only method that never requires defensive
strategy under plausible conditions--it never requires defensive strategy
unless order-reversal cheating is attempted on a scale sufficient to
change the eleciton result. And, in a full-size public election, it
won't happen--Hitler voters won't rank Stalin 2nd, knowing that it will
probably elect Stalin.

 
>
> A middle voter may hate one extremist by "absolutely" minus 99.9 percent and
> hate the other extremist by minus 100 percent- a "relative" differance of 0.1
> percent.
>
> If the middle voter votes for either extremist as a second choice, then such
> extremist may get elected with a majority and claim he/she has a "mandate"
> (to go politically crazy).

You mean in Approval, right? Because Approval is the method that has the
problem that you describe. Condorcet's method doesn't have that problem,
as I've just been discussing in this letter (and as I've repeatedly
shown you in previous letters).


>
> If the middle voter does not vote for either, then one of the extremists may
> get elected with a plurality.

If the opposite extreme voters make a bad mistaake--a completely
unnecessary and pointless mistake. As has been said, the extreme
voters have no reason to not vote for Middle in 2nd place, and at
least 1 extreme has very good reason to do so.

>
> Since all middle voters will probably not be alike, then each of them may
> strategically ask what are the other middle voters doing ?
>
> Should I vote for an extremist or not ?

No. There's no need to. But doing so is harmless under plausible
conditions.
 
> An example again (50 votes for majority)--
>
> Hitler         Stalin            Middle
>   42              41                  16    First Choice votes
>
> Does any voter dare vote for a second choice ?


As I've said, and as has been previously pointed out, the extreme
voters have absolutely no reason to not vote a 2nd chocie. The Stalin
voters have an extremely good reason to vote a 2nd choice

>
> This is the real world. Russian voters in June will very likely nominate 2
> extremists for Russia President putting Russian "middle" voters into the
> above situation in the runoff election (with potential world problems in view
> of the President-is-dictator language in the Russia Constitution).

If the Russian voters eliminate the middle Condorcet winner & get
an extremist, that's because of the defects of Runoff (& MPV), but
what does that have to do with Condorcet's method?

>
> The approval voting remedy remains to encourage the voters for the extremists
> to vote also for a middle candidate who hopefully could get a majority.

As Rob pointed out, it's the exact opposite. Approval gives the extreme
voters reason to not vote for Middle, if there's a chance that their
favorite could otherwise have a win. If their favorite has a win, & they
vote for Middle, they could be giving the election away to Middle, with
Approval. As I said, with Condorcet's method, the extreme voters have
no reason not to vote for Middle.

You've been naming Approval's problems, & attributing them to Condorcet's
method.

***

I have to agree, Demorep, that you haven't been completely fair with
us. We've taken your letters seriously enough to take the time to carefully
answer them, but you haven't shown similar respect, and have, instead,
ignored replies to your statements.

>
> Hitler         Stalin            Middle
>   45              46                  51    Approval votes
>
> It is directly due to the gerrymander indirect minority rule of legislative
> bodies in the U.S. that there is a major degree of power madness surrounding
> the various chief executive officer positions in the U.S. - U.S. President,
> Governors, Mayors, etc.
>
> If no reform comes to U.S. legislative bodies, then U.S. Civil War II is

Because reform is necessary, we've got to seriously & honestly discuss
what reform to propose to the public.

> highly likely (as in the last years of the Roman Republic with civil wars
> between Sulla and Marius, Pompey and Julius Caesar and finally Antony and
> Octavian (later Emperor Augustus Caesar)).
>
> Witness the "personal" mudslinging among the Republican party candidates for
> U.S. President- Can violence be coming between Republican candidates ?
> Between Republican and Democrat presidential candidates ?

> .-

Because there are so many possible standards & so many possible methods,
it's necessary to have an orderly approach. I suggest that we first
discuss standards. If we all agree on standards, then the next part
is the easy part: demonstrating which method meets the standard that
we've agreed on.

I've already said what standards I consider important: Getting rid
of the lesser-of-2-evils problem & protecting majority rule, &
eliminating the need for defensive strategy. I've told why Condorcet's
method meets these standards. Does anyone disagree with those standards?
Does anyone propose another standard that he believes is more important?

***

Mike Ossipoff




>


--

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Hitler-Stalin-Middle Example Again

Craig Carey-2
On Fri, 1 Mar 1996, Mike Ossipoff wrote:
> I've already said what standards I consider important: Getting rid
> of the lesser-of-2-evils problem & protecting majority rule, &
> eliminating the need for defensive strategy. I've told why Condorcet's
> method meets these standards. Does anyone disagree with those standards?
> Does anyone propose another standard that he believes is more important?

To be fair, I think ballot simplicity is important to many people.  I
would agree with you, Mike, that the reasons you stated are more important
than ballot simplicity, though, since removing those problems makes the
*decision* easier.  Since deciding who to vote for is always harder and
more important than the mechanics, I think we should push the fairest
solution, and leave the details of the ballot mechanics for later, since
that problem could be solved by leaps in technology before we generate
sufficient interest in this method.

However, if anyone has a particularly elegant way of doing a rank ballot,
I'm all ears.  Actually, what about bar-coded stamps with the name and
picture of each candidate on them, and a place for them on the ballot?
Sort of like the Publishers' Clearinghouse garbage?  It'd be a bit more
expensive than a plain ballot, but not nearly as expensive as equiping
all polling places with a ton of computers.  I think people understand
stamps pretty well, too, and the voter would be able to glance at their
ballot when all was said and done and verify it quickly.

Rob Lanphier
[hidden email]
http://www.eskimo.com/~robla