Fatal flaw in the monotonicity argument: it turns out that raising X to Top on one ballot might increase the approval of Y on other ballots where alternative Y is still ranked higher than X. So even though we have shown that the approval of X does not decrease, there is a possibility that the approval of alternative Y might surpass it.
On Monday, November 30, 2020, Forest Simmons <[hidden email]> wrote:
A while back I made an attempt to de clone Copeland while preserving the property of electing uncovered alternatives. Although I got tantalizingly close I could not quite pull it off at the time. But recent discussions about the difficulty voters have deciding approval cut offs have led me to explore various ideas one of which gave me the key to success in our old Copeland sprucing up endeavor.
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