Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 187, Issue 17

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Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 187, Issue 17

steve bosworth



Hi Jack (see below),
Correct me if I'm mistaken that you are looking for a voting method that would assure every voter that their vote will not me *diluted*.  If so, you may be interest in Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR).  It allows each voter to grade the suitability for office of as many candidates as they want as being either Excellent (ideal), Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, or Reject (entire unsuitable).  For example, unlike any alternative method, EPR allows each citizen to be assured that one of the elected city council member will have received either their highest grade, their remaining highest grade, or their proxy vote.  Consequently, each member has a weighted vote in the council exactly equal to the number of citizens who have given them their vote.  Each member, or group of members, has a vote in the council exactly equal to the support they have received from voters (one person-one vote).  No vote is needlessly wasted either quantitatively or qualitatively.  Each racial or other minority is represented proportionately. Fully to describe how EPR works, my two co-authors and I have just now published the following article: *Legislatures Elected by Evaluative Proportional Representation (EPR): An Algorithm*(2020 Jan.) Journal of Political Risk:  

https://www.jpolrisk.com/legislatures-elected-by-evaluative-proportional-representation-epr-an-algorithm-v3/


Feel free to ask me any questions or give me any other feedback.




Message: 1
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 12:38:25 -0500
From: Jack Santucci <[hidden email]>
To: [hidden email]
Subject: [EM] Sequential (proportional) approval voting and VRA
        considerations
Message-ID:
        <[hidden email]>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

Hi,

This seems like a good venue to raise the following concern.

In working through SPAV (
https://twitter.com/jacksantucci/status/1217959180834951175?s=20), I have
arrived at the following conclusion.

It literally and mechanically dilutes the voting strength of a cohesive
minority, if some of that minority "approves" of a winning candidate in the
majority. The key term there is "vote dilution."

And do not mistake me for a preference voting shill. As you'll see in the
tweet, STV has properties that feel similar. But they are not the same as
what I see in SPAV. Unless I am seeing things that don't exist.

I suspect that the response (if I am right) will be to re-engineer SPAV, in
order to rescue the broader concept of "approval voting." Have at it if you
want. But the implications for minorities in polarized settings (see
http://mattbarreto.com/papers/polarized_voting_wa.pdf) have to be priority
#1.

Jack
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