Re: [ER] Re: Explaining pairwise

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Re: [ER] Re: Explaining pairwise

Craig Carey-2
Kevin Hornbuckle writes:

>
> > And here's the complete description:
> > "Each voter ranks the candidates from most preferred to least
> > preferred.  The info provided in the voters' rankings is used to
> > determine the winners of each of the possible head-to-head pairings.
> > The winner is the candidate whose worst pairing defeat is smallest."
>
> There is a problem with this.
> If this were written as law, there would be a lot of spoiled ballots
> because not every voter would rank all candidates. There is no logical
> necessity to rank all the candidates.
> So it should say "may rank the candidates".
>

This brings up an important difference between Condorcet's method
& other Pairwise-Count methods: In other methods, including
the one known as "Copeland's method", voters who vote a short
ranking can thereby steal the election from the candidate who'd
have otherwise won, the candidate who'd beat each of the others
in separate 1-on-1 elections--with the result that the winner is
the favorite candidate of the voters who voted the short rankings.

That can't happen in Condorcet's method. An important difference
between Condorcet & Copeland. I mention Copeland because some
academic authors advocate it, & electoral reformers may hear
about it at some point. By the standards important to voters
& electoral reformers, Copeland comes out on the wrong end of
a comparison with Condorcet.


Mike Ossipoff




Mike Ossipoff

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