Though order-reversal won't happen on a significant scale, not enough
to make a difference, in public elections, and though, even in the
most devious electorate, it's well easily thwarted & well-deterred,
as I described, let me add:
I should still mention that during my correspondence with Bruce,
I sent him a whole list of features that could be added to Condorcet,
so that, in really devious electorates, order-reversal could be
thwarted even more easily, and even automtatically, by these additional
features that could be added, leaving little or nothing for the voter
to do about the possibility of order-reversal, in a devious electorate.
In other words, those features would approach, or maybe virtually reach,
the goal of a completely strategy-free method--a method that
never requires any kind of defensive strategy, even under the most
improbably, implausibly adverse & devious conditions.
I'll of course send that list of added devious-electorate features
upon request. I'd list them here, but, other than sending them
upon request, including them here would probably be going outside
the topic of this discussion. So I'm just mentioning that those
features exist and offering to send a list of them to anyone who
But I feel that the order-reversal objection has already been
rebutted. Especially since Copeland, as I showed in the example,
is the one that's more vulnerable to order-reversal, as well
as (unlike Condorcet) being vulnerable to the commonly expected
practice of truncation (voting a short ranking).